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Effects of Characteristics of Audit Committee on Earnings Management in 
Nigerian Quoted Companies 
ERIABIE, SYLVESTER, PhD AND ODIA, JAMES, PhD1 
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of Characteristics of Audit 
Committee on Eamings Management in Nigerian quoted companies. Data for the 
study were sourced from annual reports of one hundred and thirty one (131) 
companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange over the period of 2008 to 
2014. The data were analysed using descriptive, correlation and Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS). The multivariate regression technique was utilised to estimate our 
model. The choice of this approach was based on the fact that our data are both 
time series and cross sectional. Our findings, using the panel regression results, 
indicate that each of these characteristics of audit committee, namely: audit 
committee independence, audit committee frequency of meetings and audit 
committee meeting attendance had a negative significant impact on eamings _ 
management. This implies that audit committee independence, audit commitTee 
frequency of meetings and audit committee meeting attendance are useful in 
reducing to the barest minimum, management's tendencies for opportunistic 
behaviour to manipulate eamings. Based on these findings, the paper 
recommends among others that, in order to strengthen the impact of audit 
committee independence on eamings management, the number of non-executive 
directors should be increased. Besides, non-executive directors should be 
appointed on the basis of competence and integrity. In addition, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Central Bank of Nigeria should put in place a 
regulation which ensures statutory position on the maximum number of meetings 
to be held by audit committee members in a year. The practice whereby audit 
committee members are simply there just to complete the audit committee size 
without active attendance and participation at meetings should be curtailed. 
Keywords: Earnings Management, Audit Committee Independence, Meetings, 
Attendance. 
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C o m p a n i e s  
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
I s s u e s  o f  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  h a v e  a t t r a c t e d  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  s t a k e h o l d e r s  a n d  
r e s e a r c h e r s  f o l l o w i n g  s e r i e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  f a i l u r e s  i n  c o m p a n i e s  s u c h  a s  S a v a n n a h  
B a n k  a n d  A f r i c a n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B a n k  ( O d i a ,  2 0 0 7 ) ;  W e m a  B a n k ,  F i n b a n k  a n d  
S p r i n g  ( A d e y e m i & F a g b e m i , 2 0 1 0 )  a n d  I n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l  B a n k  P i c  i n  2 0 0 9 .  T h i s  
h a s  m a d e  i n v e s t o r s  a n d  r e g u l a t o r s  t o  l o s e  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  t h e .  
c o r p o r a t e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  i n  N i g e r i a ,  e v i d e n c e d  b y  i s s u e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  
i n s o l v e n c y  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  u n q u a l i f i ·e d  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  b y  d i r e c t o r s .  T h i s  p o s e s  d e s p e r a t e  t i m e s  f o r  s t a k e h o l d e r s ·  a s  
s u c h  c o r p o r a t e  f a i l u r e s  a r e  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  ' ( S a n u s i :  
2 0 1 2 ) . D e s p e r a t e  t i m e s  n o  d o u b t  r e q u i r e  d e s p e r a t e ,  u n u s u a l  m e a s u r e s .  . ,  
• (  
S a n u s i  ( 2 0 1 2 )  p r o v i d e s  e v i d e n c e  o f  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  t h e · N i g e r i a n  b a n k i n g ' .  
s e c t o r .  S c h i p p e r  ( 1 9 8 9 )  i s  o f  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  u n r e s t r a i s e d  u s e  o f  e a r r ' l i n g s ·  
m a n a g e m e n t  b y  m a n a g e r s  o f  c o m p a n i e s  d i s t o r t s  t h e  i n f o r m a t i ' o n · ·  c o s t e n t  
1
b .  
e a r n i n g s .  T h e s e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  h a v e  f o c u s e d  a t t e n t i o n  o n  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  
a n d  e n c o u r a g e d  r e g u l a t o r s  a n d  r e s e a r c h e r s  t o  s e e k  w a y s  o f  e l i m i n a t i n g  ' o r '  
d r a s t i c a l l y  r e d u c i n g  t o  t h e  b a r e s t  m i n i m u m  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  e a r n i n g s )  
m a n a g e m e n t ,  w h i c h  h a v e  n o  d o u b t  m i s l e d  u s e r s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  i n  m a k i h g  
i n f o r m e d  d e c i s i o n s .  , . .  
I  
T h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  ( A C )  i s  a  c e n t r a l  e l e m e n t  o f  o n e ·  o f  s u c h  r e f o r m s  t h a t  c a n  
e n s u r e  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  a n d  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  t h r o u g h  a n  o p e n  a n d  
c a n d i d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a n d  a  g o o d  w o r k i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p ·  w i t h  c o m p a n i e s '  b o a r d  o f  
d i r e c t o r s ,  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  a n d  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  ( M u s t a f a ,  2 0 1 2 ) .  
I n  N i g e r i a ,  t h e  c r e a t i o n  a n d  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i s  m a d e  
m a n d a t o r y  b y  t h e  C o m p a n i e s  a n d  A l l i e d  M a t t e r s  A c t  ( C A M A )  o f  2 0 0 4 .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  C A M A ,  S e c t i o n  3 5 9  ( 4 ) ,  t h e  m a k e u p  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  " s h a l l  
c o n s i s t  o f  a n  e q u a l  n u m b e r  o f  d i r e c t o r s  a n d  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o f  
t h e  c o m p a n y  ( s u b j e c t  t o  a  m a x i m u m  n u m b e r  o f  s i x  m e m b e r s ) " .  W h a t  S e c u r i t y  
a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e a l l y  m e a n s  b y  n u m b e r  o f  d i r e c t o r s  i s  e q u a l  n u m b e r  
o f  E x e c u t i v e  a n d  N o n - E x e c u t i v e  D i r e c t o r s  a s  a l l  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  c o d e s  
r e c o m m e n d  e q u a l  n u m b e r  o f  E D s  a n d  N E D s  i n  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  c o m p o s i t i o n  
t o  e n s u r e  a  b a l a n c e  o f  m e m b e r s h i p .  T h e  m a i n  o b j e c t i v e  o f  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i s  t o  
a c t  a s  a  m o n i t o r i n g  m e c h a n i s m  a n d  p r o t e c t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  s t a k e h o l d e r s  w i t h  a  
v i e w  o f  e n s u r i n g  u n b i a s e d  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  ( O n , g ;  2 0 1 3 ) .  R a m s a y ,  ( 2 0 0 1 )  s t a t e d  
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t~~t tne ,P~~o~~ '9~ii{a,gltshmwn of an audit committee is to improve on financial 
reporting practices and ensure quality of earnings. 
There is, therefore, a profound need to explore the characteristics of an audit 
committee in the Nigerian context, the changing nature of these characteristics 
~9d, ~d.s~o<~_il~J~i?~~ L?f1 , rhe,~e chaJi~q~ristics with earnings management in Nigerian 
qu te . sompames. . I , / 
.1 1 t ) 'J 1 j _, _. I , 
Audit committee is proxied by three characteristics adopted in thi s study to 
measure its impact . RR- ~ ~~rn~~~~. management in Nigerian quoted companies. They 
are: audit committee if\<:Jepepdence, audit committee frequency of meetings and 
audit committee meetin~ a~~~Ad<l?ce. 
Previous studies relating, , t,? . ~u,dit committee and earnings management 
concentrated on developed econoplie,s with mixed and inconclusive results. For 
example, Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) found a negative relationship 
between independent non-executive directors and earnings management, while in 
the contrary, Iyengar, Land and Zampelli (2010) did not find significant 
association between indepen,dence of audi t committee and earnings management. 
The aforementioned findings are output of developed countries, which have 
different regulatory framework, institutional structures and government 
mechanisms with those of Nigeria. Thus, this study in Nigeria will be of 
tremendous importance in evaluating the evidence from developing economies. 
Related studies in Nigeria (Audit committee attributes and earnings management, 
lbadin and Afensimi, 2015 ; An evaluation of the implications of earnings 
management determinants in the banking industry, Dabor & lbadin, 2013) which 
investigated the relationship between audit committee and earnings management 
are few in number, the methodologies of these studies pose questions about their 
sample size. Using a sample size of fifty (50) out of one hundred and ninety four 
(194) companies quoted on the Nigeria Stock Exchange makes the sample size 
too small to be representative of the population and therefore their resu1is could 
not be reliable and moreso may not be generalized to all listed companies. The 
sample size of this study is one-hundred and thirty one listed companies, making 
up 66% of the population. This is in conformity with the minimum requirements 
of Taro Yamane's formula on sample size (Yamane, 1967). 
The existing gap in knowledge provides the impetus and justification for this 
study. The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the 
141 
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C o m p a n i e s  
l i t e r a t u r e  r e v i e w ,  s e c t i o n  3  l o o k s  a t  t h e  m e t h o d o l o g y ,  s e c t i o n  4  f o c u s e s  o n  
a n a l y s i s  a n d  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  r e s u l t s  w h i l e  s e c t i o n  5  a d d r e s s e s  c o n c l u s i o n  a n d  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  
O b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  S t u d y  
T h e  m a i n  o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  o n  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  N i g e r i a n  q u o t e d  c o m p a n i e s .  T h e  
s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t i v e s  a r e  t o :  
i )  E v a l u a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  o n  
e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  N i g e r i a n  q u o t e d  c o m p a n i e s .  
i i )  D e t e r m i n e  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  f r e q u e n c y  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g s  o n  
e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  N i g e r i a n  q u o t e d  c o m p a n i e s .  
i i i )  A s c e r t a i n  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  l e v e l  o f  a t t e n d a n c e  a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g s  o n  
e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  N i g e r i a n  q u o t e d  c o m p a n i e s .  
R e s e a r c h  H y p o t h e s e s  
B a s e d  o n  t h e  r e v i e w  o f  l i t e r a t u r e ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  h y p o t h e s e s  a r e  f o r m u l a t e d :  
H
1
:  T h e r e  i s  n o  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  a n d  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t .  
H
2
:  F r e q u e n c y  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g s  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n f l u e n c e  o n  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t .  
H
3
:  T h e  l e v e l  o f  a t t e n d a n c e  a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g s  h a s  n o  s i g n i f i c a n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t .  
L i t e r a t u r e  R e v i e w  
C o n c e p t  o f  E~rnings M a n ! " . g e m e n t  
T h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  m e a n i n g s  o f  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  ( S t o l o w y  &  B r e t o n ,  2 0 0 0  
a n d  Y a p i n g ,  2 0 0 5 ) .  T h e  c o n c e p t  o f  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  c o m e s  u n d e r  t h e  
u m b r e l l a  o f  e a r n i n g s  m a n i p u l a t i o n .  E a r n i n g s  m a n i p u l a t i o n  i n c l u d e s  a l l  s t r a t e g i e s  
a d o p t e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  a  b u s i n e s s  t o  p r e s e n t  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  s h o w  
p r e c o n c e i v e d  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  p o s i t i o n  a n d  p r o g r e s s  o f  a n  e n t e r p r i s e ,  w h i c h  
i s  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  e c o n o m i c  t r a n s a c t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r m .  
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There are various types of accounts manipulation and there is generally a thin line 
of difference between them (Brown, 1999). Stolowy and Breton (2000) strictly 
defined earnings management as consisting of the use of accounting choices and 
restructuring of business activities with the intent to mislead investors. This has to 
do with managers making choices from accounting policies for their personal 
benefits. Earnings management does take place while accmmting regulation is not 
contravened. 
Davidson, Stickney and Well ( 1987) defined earnings management as "a process 
of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting 
principles to bring about a desired level of reporting earnings". 
Healy and Wahlen (1999:6) indicated that "earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers". 
Kinnunen. Kasanen, and Niskanen (1995) opi'1ed that management misleads 
shareholders as regards the financial performance of the company by producing 
financial statements which do not represent the company's value or net worth. 
Levitt (1998) indicated that earnings management is whereby managers cut 
comers such that earnings reflect the interest of management and not the true 
financial position of the firm. This study uses earnings management in its 
narrowest sense as defined by Healy and Wahlem (1999) and Davidson et al., 
(1987).Earnings management can be measured by using discretionary accruals, 
which are subject to management discretion. The most popular six models for 
determining the existence of earnings management are the DeAngelo (1986), 
Healy (1985) Model, the Jones (1991) Model; the Modified Model, the Industry 
Model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1995), and the Cross-.Jectional Jones Model 
(Defond & Jiambalvo, 1994). This study measures earnings management using 
discretionary accruals derived from the Modified-Jones 1991 model. 
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A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  I n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  E a r n i n g s  M a n a g e m e n t  
A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i m p l i e s  t h a t  i t s  m e m b e r s  d o  n o t  h a v e  a n y  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  a  c o m p a n y  a l o n g s i d e  n o  i n f l u e n c e  f r o m  a n y  
o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  o f f i c e r s  a n d  e x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y  o n  
t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
e n s u r e s  a n  e f f e c t i v e  m o n i t o r i n g  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a s  i t  r e l a t e s  t o  f i n a n c i a l  m a t t e r s  
t h e r e b y  e n s u r i n g  r e l i a b i l i t y  o n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  b y  u s e r s .  M u c h  o f  t h e  
b l a m e  a n d  c r i t i c i s m  f o r  a c c o u n t i n g  i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  i s  a i m e d  a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  f o r  
n o t  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  o v e r s i g h t  d u t i e s  d u e  t o  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i s s u e s  
( P e r g o l a ,  2 0 0 5 ) .  
X i e ,  D a v i d s o n  a n d  D a d a l t  ( 2 0 0 3 )  s t a t e d  t h a t  a  m o r e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
i s  a r g u e d  t o  p r o v i d e  b e t t e r  g o v e r n a n c e  a n d  l e s s  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  c o m p a r e d  
t o  a  l e s s  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  B e d a r d ,  C h t o u r o u a n d  C o u r t e a u  ( 2 0 0 4 )  
w e r e  o f  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  p r a c t i c e  i s  n o t  l i k e l y  t o  h a p p e n  f o r  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  w i t h  h i g h  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  n o n - e x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r s .  A s  
a  r e s u l t ,  i t  i s  l o g i c a l  t o  e x p e c t  t h a t  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i s  
n e g a t i v e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  e a r n i n g s  m a ' l a g e m e n t  p r a c t i . c e .  
O t h e r  s t u d i e s '  r e s u l t s  d i f f e r .  I y e n g a r  e t  a l  ( 2 0 1 0 )  s h o w e d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  
s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  e a r n i n g s  
m a n a g e m e n t .  K l e i n  ( 2 0 0 2 )  a l s o  o b s e r v e d  n o  s i g n i f i c a n t  a s s o c i a t i o n  b e t w e e n  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t .  
O n e  p o s s i b l e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  s o m e  o f  t h e  f i n d i n g s  i s  t h a t  t h e  m o r e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i s ,  t h e  l e s s  l i k e l y  i s  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t  f r a u d .  
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  M e e t i n g s  a n d  E a r n i n g s  M a n a g e m e n t  
R e g u l a t o r s  a n d  o t h e r s  h a v e  e x p r e s s e d  a  s t r o n g  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
t h a t  m e e t s  f r e q u e n t l y .  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g s  i m p l y  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  t i m e s  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  m e e t .  T h i s  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  a t t e n d a n c e  a t  m e e t i n g s .  
F r e q u e n t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g s  a l l o w  f o r  b e t t e r  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  b e t w e e n  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  a n d  a u d i t o r s  ( b o t h  e x t e r n a l  a n d  i n t e r n a l )  a n d  e n a b l e  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  t o  b e  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  [ T h e  P u b l i c  O v e r s i g h t  B o a r d , 1 9 9 3 ,  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  
a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  C h a i r m a n ,  L e v i t t ,  1 9 9 9  &  t h e  B l u e  R i b b o n  
C o m m i t t e e ,  1 9 9 9 ] .  
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An audit comntittee that meets fr~quently can reduce the possibility of earnings 
management (Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2004). Bryan, Liu and Tiras (2004) 
posited that audit comntittees that meet regularly are often expected to be able to 
perform monitoring tasks more effectively than o~hers that do not meet regularly. 
Beasley, Carc~llo, Hermanson and Lapides (2000) found th1t fraudulent firms 
with earnings misstatements have fewer audit committee meetings thar non-fraud 
firms. When audit comntittees meet often, earnings management is less (Xie, et 
al, 2003 & Vafeas, 2005). 
However, empirical evidence on the impact of frequency of audit committee 
meeting on earnings management also differs. Bedard, Chtourou and Courtteay 
(2004) and Lin, Li and Yang (2006) did not find any negative association between 
the frequency of audit comntittee meetings and earnings management. 
It follows, therefore, that an active audit comntittee with more meetings has more 
time to oversee the financial reporting process, identify management risk and 
monitor internal controls. Consequently. earnings management tends to decrease 
with more audit comntittee activity. 
Audit Committee Attendance at Meetings and Earnings Management 
Apart from the frequency of meetings, the level of attendance of audit comntittee 
members can also be used to measure how active audit comntittee members are. 
The level of attendance of audit comntittee members implies the number of times 
each member of an audit comntittee attends audit comntittee meetings. This is 
quite different from the frequency of audit comntittee meetings which means the 
number of meetings held by audit comntittee members. If the frequency of an 
audit comntittee meeting is high and the attendance level is low, this may impede 
the efficiency of the audit comntittee members in reducing earnings management 
(Nordin & Marini, 2009). It therefore follows that the more active and 
parti-::ipativc the auJ!t comntiltee me,nbers <.re, t'ne less is ea.ning~, management. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical basis for this study is the agency theory which emanates from the 
relationship between the principal (owners) and the agent (managers). Audit 
comntittees primarily align the interests of owners with the management's 
interest. The establishment of audit comntittees is regarded as a reaction to 
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i n f o r m a t i o n  a s y m m e t r i e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  o w n e r s  o f  a  c o m p a n y  a n d  i t s  m a n a g e m e n t  
( H e r z i g  &  W a t r i n ,  1 9 9 5 ) .  D e m s e t z  a n d  L e h n  ( 1 9 8 5 )  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  p r i m a r y  
o b j e c t i v e  o f  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i s  t o  r e s o l v e  a g e n c y  p r o b l e m s  b y  m o n i t o r i n g  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  b e h a v i o u r  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  e a r n i n g s  
m a n a g e m e n t .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  e n h a n c i n g  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s ,  w i l l  l e a d  t o  r e d u c i n g  
e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  t o  i t s  b a r e s t  m i n i m u m  
M e t h o d o l o g y  
R e s e a r c h  D e s i g n  a n d  S o u r c e  o f  d a t a  
T h e  s t u d y  u s e d  t h e  p a n e l  d a t a  e s t i m a t i o n  t e c h n i q u e  o f  c o m p a n i e s  l i s t e d  i n  t h e  
N i g e r i a n  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  o f  2 0 0 8  t o  2 0 1 4 .  S e c o n d a r y  d a t a  
d e r i v e d  f r o m  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  o f  o n e  h u n d r e d  a n d  t h i r t y  o n e  c o m p a n i e s  l i s t e d  i n  t h e  
N i g e r i a n  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e ,  w e r e  u t i l i z e d  f o r  t h e  s t u d y .  A  t o t a l  o f  o n e  h u n d r e d  a n d  
n i n e t y  f o u r  (  1 9 4 )  q u o t e d  c o m p a n i e s  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n .  T h e  s a m p l e  s i z e  
c o n s i s t s  o f  o n e  h u n d r e d  a n d  t h i r t y  o n e  ( 1 3 1 )  c o m p a n i e s  u s i n g  T a r o  Y a m a n e  
f o r m u l a  ( Y a m a n e ,  1 9 9 6 ) .  
T h e  s a m p l e  s i z e  c a l c u l a t i o n  u s i n g  t h e  T a r o  Y a m a n e  f o r m u l a  b e l o w :  
n =  N / 1  +  N  ( e )
2  
W h e r e  
n  =  S a m p l e  s i z e  
N =  P o p u l a t i o n  s i z e  
e  =  L e v e l  o f  p r e c i s i o n  ( e r r o r  l i m i t ) .  F o r  t h i s  s t u d y ,  0 . 0 5  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  9 5 %  
c o n f i d e n c e  l e v e l  
n  =  1 9 4 / 1  +  1 9 4  ( 0 . 0 5 )  
2  
n  =  1 3 0 . 6  
n  =  1 3 1  
T h e  c h o i c e  o f  c o m p a n i e s  w a s  b a s e d  o n  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  d a t a  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
c o m p a n i e s  i n  o p e r a t i o n  f o r  s e v e n  c o n s e c u t i v e  y e a r s  t a k i n g  c o g n i z a n c e  o f  s e c t o r a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  e l e v e n  (  1 1 )  s e c t o r s  o f  c o m p a n i e s  q u o t e d  o n  t h e  N i g e r i a n  S t o c k  
E x c h a n g e .  
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Model Specification 
Arising from the extant literature, audit committee independence, audit committee 
frequency of meetings and audit committee meeting attendance are observed to 
have effect on earnings management. Hence, the relationship between these 
aforementioned audit committee characteristics and earnings management is 
expressed as: 
EM=.f(ACIND, ACFM, ACMA) -------------------------------------------- (1) 
In econometric form: 
DACC t= 8o +8,ACINDit + 82ACFMit + 83ACMAit +8J3DDILiit +8sBDINDit +J.lit 
--------------(2) 
Where: 
DACC--------------------Discretionary Accruals(proxy for Earnings Management) 
ACIND--------------------Audit Committee Independence 
ACFM -------------------- Audit Committee Frequency of Meetings 
ACMA---------------------Audit Committee Meeting Attendance 
BDDILI ----------------------Board Diligence 
BDINl) ------ ---------------Board Independence 
J.li t ----------------------------------Error term 
81---89 ------Unknown coefficients of the variables. It is expected as 
81-------89 < 0 
DACC was adopted from modified-Jones (1991) model. It is determined as the 
residual (difference) between TAC(Total Accruals) and NDAC(Non-
Discretionary Accruals) shown as follows: 
DACC ,t=[ITAC.d/Ai,t-tl- a, (1/At-1) +a2 {(L.\REVcL.\RECt)/At-2} +a3 (PPEt/At-1-
----------(3) 
The variables in the model are measured in Table 1 as follows: 
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T a b l e  1 :  O p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  V a r i a b l e s  
S I N  
Variable~ D e f i n i t i o n  T y p e  
M e a s u r e m e n  A u t h o r s  
t  
1 .  E M  
E a r n i n g s  D e p e n d e n t  
D i s c r e t i o n a r y  M o d i f i e d  
M a n a g e m e n t  A c c r u a l s  
J o n e s ,  1 9 9 1  
m o d e l  
2 .  
A C I N D  
A u d i t  I n d e p e n d e n  N o .  o f  n o n -
B e d a r d ,  
C o m m i t t e e  t  e x e c u t i v e  
C h t o u r o u  a n d  
I n d e p e n d e n c  d i r e c t o r s  
C o u r t e a u ,  2 0 0 4  
e  ( o u t s i d e  
d i r e c t o r s )  i n  
t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  
3 .  A C F M  A u d i t  I n d e p e n d e n  N o .  o f  t i m e s  
A b b o t t ,  P a r k e r  
C o m m i t t e e  t  
t h e  a u d i t  &  P e t e r s ,  2 0 0 4  
F r e q u e n c y  o f  
c o m m i t t e e  
M e e t i n g s  
m e e t s  i n  a  
y e a r  
4 .  
A C M A  A u d i t  I n d e p e n d e n  
N o .  o f  a u d i t  N o r c i i n &  
C o m m i t t e e  t  
c o m m i t t e e  M a r i n i ,  2 0 0 9  
M e e t i n g  
m e m b e r s  i n  
A t t e n d a n c e  a t t e n d a n c e  a t  
e a c h  m e e t i n g  
5 .  B D D I L I  B o a r d  I n d e p e n d e n  
N o .  o f  X i e ,  
D i l i g e n c e  t  ( c o n t r o l )  
m e e t i n g s  h e l d  
D a v i d s o n &  
b y  t h e  b o a r d  
D a d a l t , 2 0 0 3 .  
6 .  B D I N D  B o a r d  I n d e p e n d e n  
N o .  o f  n o n -
U w u i g b e ,  2 0 1 1  
I n d e p e n d e n c  
t  e x e c u t i v e  
e  ( c o n t r o l )  
d i r e c t o r s  ( i . e .  
v u t s i c : : . -
d i r e c t o r s ) .  
F o r  o n e  h u n d r e d  a n d  t h i r t y  o n e  c o m p a n i e s  (  1 3 1 )  o b s e r v e d ,  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  w e r e  
m e a s u r e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  e a c h  c o m p a n y ,  c o v e r i n g  a  p e r i o d  o f  s e v e n  y e a r s  ( 2 0 0 8  t o  
2 0 1 4 ) .  
r n a !  
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Analysis and Presentation of Results 
This section presents in detail, descriptive statistics, pearson correlation, 
regression results, test of hypotheses and ordinary least square regression. 
Table 2 presents the result of the descriptive statistics of the variables as follows: 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
DACC ACIND ACFM 
Mean 2.64E-07 2.926 3.4971 
Median -3.19E-05 3 4 
Max 0.004968 3 12 
Min -0.00026 2 1 
Std. Dev. 0. 000304 0.261 1.0348 
Jarque-Bera 660154.2 1672 2483 
Probability 0.00 0 0 
Source: Author's Compilation (2015) 
DACC= Discretionary ac..:ruals 
ACIND=Audit committee independence 
ACFM= Audit committee frequency of meeting 
ACMTA=Audit committee meeting attendance 
BDDIL=Board Diligence 
BDIND=Board Independence 
ACMA BDDIL BDIND 
4.0294 4.3853 4.2971 
4 4 4 
6 9 12 
2 2 0 
1.2688 0.8999 1.7791 
24.484 242.55 200.93 
0 0 0 
Table 2 as shown above, presents the result for the descriptive statist~cs for the 
variables. As observed in table 2 above, DACC has a mean value of 2.64E-
07which suggests minimal DACC value for sample with maximum and minimum 
values of 0.00496 and -0.0003 respectively. The standard deviation of 0.0003 
st.:gges~:. that ~!"-':! :JAC·:::: va!ti~S acws~ the comp<,,~:es ex !"it its con::;ider;:~!:-le 
clustering around the average. The Jacque-Bera statistic of 660154.2 alongside its 
p-value (p=0.00<0.05) indicates that the data satisfy normality and as well as the 
unlikelihood of outliers in the series. ACIND has a mean value of 2.963 with 
maximum and minimum values of 3 and 2 respectively. The spread of the data 
around the mean is 0.261 which suggests considerable clustering around the 
average. The Jacque-Bera statistic of 1672 alongside its p-value (p=0.00<0.05) 
indicates that the data satisfy normality. The mean for ACFM is 3.497 with 
maximum and minimum values of 12 and 1 respectively. The standard deviation 
149 
· I 
E f f e c s t  o f  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  E a r n i n g s  M a n a g e m e n t  i n  N i g e r i a n  Q u o t e d  
C o m p a n i e s  
o f  1 . 0 3 5  s u g g e s t s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c l u s t e r i n g  a r o u n d  t h e  a v e r a g e .  T h e  J a c q u e - B e r a  
s t a t i s t i c  o f  2 4 8 3  a l o n g s i d e  i t s  p - v a l u e  ( p = 0 . 0 0 < 0 . 0 5 )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  s a t i s f y  
n o r m a l i t y .  T h e  m e a n  f o r  A C M A  i s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  4 . 0 2 9 4  w i t h  m a x i m u m  a n d  
m i n i m u m  v a l u e s  o f  6  a n d  2  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  o f  1 . 2 6 8 8  
s u g g e s t s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c l u s t e r i n g  a r o u n d  t h e  a v e r a g e .  T h e  J a c q u e - B e r a  s t a t i s t i c  o f  
2 4 . 4 8 4  a l o n g s i d e  i t s  p - v a l u e  ( p = 0 . 0 0 < 0 . 0 5 )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  s a t i s f y  
n o r m a l i t y .  T h e  m e a n  f o r  B D D I L  m e a s u r e d  b y  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  b o a r d  m e e t i n g s  i s  
4 . 3 8 5  w i t h  m a x i m u m  a n d  m i n i m u m  v a l u e s  o f  9  a n d  2  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h e  s t a n d a r d  
d e v i a t i o n  i s  0 . 8 9 9  w i t h  a  J a c q u e - B e r a  s t a t i s t i c  o f  2 4 2 . 5 5  a l o n g s i d e  i t s  p - v a l u e  
( 0 . 0 0 )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  s a t i s f y  n o r m a l i t y .  T h e  m e a n  f o r  B D I N D  i s  4 . 2 9  w i t h  
m a x i m u m  a n d  m i n i m u m  v a l u e s  o f  1 2  a n d  0  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  
o f  1 . 7 8  s u g g e s t s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  c l u s t e r i n g  a r o u n d  t h e  a v e r a g e .  T h e  J a c q u e - B e r a  
s t a t i s t i c  o f  2 0 0 . 9 3  a l o n g s i d e  i t s  p - v a l u e  ( p = 0 . 0 0 < 0 . 0 5 )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  
s a t i s f y  n o r m a l i t y .  N e x t ,  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  s h a l l  b e  
e x a m i n e d .  
C o r r e l a t i o n  A n a l y s e s  
O f  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e 5 t  t o  t h i s  s t u d y  i s  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  D A C C  a n d  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  ( s e e  A p p e n d i x  1 - P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n  
S t a t i s t i c s ) .  A s  o b s e r v e d  i n  A p p e n d i x ! ,  a  p o s i t i v e  a s s o c i a t i o n  i s  o b s e r v e d  b e t w e e n  
D A C C  a n d  A C I N D  ( r = 0 . 0 3 2 ) .  T h o u g h  w e a k ,  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  
A C I N D  m a y  n o t  b e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  d e c l i n e  i n  D A C C .  A  p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
w a s  a l s o  o b s e r v e d  b e t w e e n  D A C C  a n d  A C F M  ( r = 0 . 0 1 7 ) .  T h o u g h  w e a k ,  t h e  
c o r r e l a t i o n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  A C F M  m i g h t  n o t  b e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  d e c l i n e  i n  
D A C C .  A C M A  i s  o b s e r v e d  t o  c o r r e l a t e  n e g a t i v e l y  w i t h  D A C C  ( r =  - 0 . 0 6 ) .  
T h o u g h  w e a k ,  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  A C M A  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  d e c l i n e  
i n  D A C C . D A C C  a p p e a r s  t o  c o r r e l a t e  n e g a t i v e l y  w i t h  B D D I L ( r =  - 0 . 0 5 3 )  a n d  
B D I N D  ( - 0 . 0 4 1 ) .  T h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s  i s  q u i t e  l o w  a n d  s u g g e s t s  t h e  l i k e l y  a b s e n c e  o f  
m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y  a r r • o n g s t  t t 1 e  v:~riables . 
R e g r e s s i o n  D i a g n o s t i c  a n d  S p e c i f i c a t i o n  T e s t s  
T h e  v a r i a n c e  i n f l a t i o n  f a c t o r  ( V I F )  { s e e  A p p e n d i x  2  - R e g r e s s i o n  A s s u m p t i o n s  
T e s t }  s h o w s  h o w  m u c h  o f  t h e  v a r i a n c e  o f  a  c o e f f i c i e n t  e s t i m a t e  o f  a  r e g r e s s o r  h a s  
b e e n  i n f l a t e d  d u e  t o  c o l l i n e a r i t y  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  r e g r e s s o r s .  B a s i c a l l y ,  V I F s  a b o v e  
1 0  a r e  s e e n  a s  a  c a u s e  o f  c o n c e r n  ( L a n d a u  &  E v e r i t t ,  2 0 0 3 ) .  A s  o b s e r v e d  i n  
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Appendix 2, none of the variables have VIF' s values exceeding lO and hence 
none gave serious indication of multicollinearity. 
The ARCH test for heteroscedasticity was performed on the residuals as a 
precaution. The results showed probabilities in excess of 0.05 (see Appendix 2), 
which leads us to reject the presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals. 
The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for higher order autocorrelation reveals that 
the hypotheses of zero autocorrelation in the residuals were not rejected. This was 
because the probabilities (Prob. F, Prob. Chi-Square) were greater than 0.05(see 
Appendix 2). The LM test did not therefore reveal serial correlation problems for 
the model. The performance of the Ramsey RESET test showed high probability 
values that were greater than 0.05 (see appendix 2), meaning that there was no 
significant evidence of miss-specification. 
Regression Results and Test of Hypotheses 
Multiple regression analyses were used to conduct a full test of the model using 
r a11d data estimro.tion technique. We present the regression results in Table 3 
alongside discussion on test of hypotheses as follows . 
Table 3: Shows the result of the fixed effects panel estimation. 
Pred. sign PANEL A PANELB PANELC 
c -6.365* -5 .550 -6.696* 
(8.227) (1.316) (4.447) 












E f f e c s t  o f  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  E a r n i n g s  M a n a g e m e n t  i n  N i g e r i a n  Q u o t e d  
C o m p a n i e s  
B D I N D  
B D D I L  
R -
F - S t a t  
P ( f - s t a t )  
D . W  
H a u s m a n  t e s t :  0 . 0 4 6  
1 . 0 8 9  
( 2 . 3 1 6 )  
{  0 . 0 2 7 )  
- 0 . 1 6 6  
( 0 . 7 3 2 )  
(  0 . 8 2 2 )  
0 . 5 5 2  
7 . 5 5  
0 . 0 0 0  
2 . 0 7  
- 2 . 0 1 4  
(  0 . 9 2 3 )  
( 0 . 3 5 5 )  
1 . 3 8 9 *  
( 0 . 5 1 9 )  
{ 0 . 0 1 2 }  
0 . 5 8 6  
5 . 6 0 5  
0 . 0 0  
2 . 0 8  
T a b l e  3 :  P a n e l  R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s  ( F i x e d  e f f e c t s )  
* a t  5 % ,  n o t e :  ( ) s t a n d s  f o r  s t a n d a r d  e r r o r  a n d  {  } r e p r e s e n t s  p - v a l u e s .  
S o u r c e :  A u t h o r ' s  C o m p i l a t i o n  ( 2 0 1 5 )  
0 . 0 1 7 2  
( 0 . 0 1 8 8 )  
{ 0 . 3 6 8 )  
- 0 . 1 6 1 8 *  
( 0 . 0 5 8 )  
{ 0 . 0 0 9 )  
0 . 5 7 9  
3 . 6 5 2  
0 . 0 0 0  
2 . 0 1  
P a n e l  A  ( i n  T a b l e  3  a b o v e ) r e s u l t s  s t a n d  f o r  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  w h i c h  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  Y ! O  s ( r ; • ? i j i c a i 1 1  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  i n d e p e n d e t l c e  o f  r r u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  memh~rs 
a n d  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t .  I n  P a n e l  A .  R
2  
=  5 5 . 2 % ,  e x p l a i n e d  s y s t e m a t i c  c h a n g e s  
i n  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t  T h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  w a s  n e g a t i v e  (  - 6 . 5 7 7 )  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t  
( p = O . O O )  a t  5 %  l e v e l .  T h e  F - s t a t  ( 7 . 5 5 )  a n d  p - v a l u e  ( 0 . 0 0 )  d i d  n o t  s u p p o r t  t h e  n u l l  
h y p o t h e s i s  o f  n o  s i g n i f i c a n t  l i n e a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  A C I N D  a n d  e a r n i n g s  
m a n a g e m e n t  h e n c e  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  a n d  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  a n d  e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t ,  w h i l e  t h e  
D .  W  s t a t i s t i c s  o f  2 . 0 7  i n d i c a t e d  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  s e r i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s i d u a l s  
i n  t h e  m o d e l .  
P a n e l  B  ( i n  T a b l e  3  a b o v e ) r e s u l t s  s t a n d  f o r  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  w h i c h  s t a t e s  t h a t  
f r e q u e n c y  o f  a u d i t  ~.:<.rmmittee m e e t i n g s  d [ ' f . S  n o t  h a v e  s i g n i f i c a n t  r c : l a t i o n s h : p  w i t h  
e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t .  I n  P a n e l  B ,  R
2  
=  5 8 . 6 % ,  e x p l a i n e d  s y s t e m a t i c  c h a n g e s  i n  
e a r n i n g s  m a n a g e m e n t .  T h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  w a s  n e g a t i v e  ( - 1 . 3 4 0 )  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  
p r e d i c t e d  s i g n  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t  ( p = O . O O )  a t  5 %  l e v e l .  T h e  F - s t a t  ( 5 . 6 0 5 )  a n d  p - v a l u e  
( 0 . 0 0 )  d i d  n o t  s u p p o r t  t h e  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  o f  n o  s i g n i f i c a n t  l i n e a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a t  
5 %  l e v e l  h e n c e  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  a n d  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  f r e q u e n c y  o f  
1 5 2  
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audit committee meetings and earnings management, while the D. W statistics of 
2.08 indicated the absence of a serial correlation of the residuals in the model. 
Panel C (in Table 3 above) results stand for the hypothesis which states that the 
level of attendance at audit committee meetings has no significant relationship 
with earnings management. In Panel C, R2 = 57.9%, indicated systematic changes 
in earnings management. The coefficient was negative ( -1.696) in line with the 
predicted sign and significant (p=O.OO) at 5% level. The F-stat (3 .652) and p-value 
(0.000) did not support the null hypothesis of no significant linear relationship at 
5% level, thereby resulting to the rejection of the null hypothesis and acceptance 
of the alternative hypothesis, that there is a significant relationship between the 
level of attendance at audit committee meetings and earnings mana,gement, while 
the D. W statistics of 2.01 indicated the absence of a serial correlation of the 
residuals in the model. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of characteristics of 
audit committee on earnings management in Nigerian quoted companies. Using_ 
the agency theoretical iramcvwrk, the study postulates, in lin~ with prior studies 
that characteristics of audit comminee can significantly impact on earnings 
management. To buttress this postulation, audit comrninee characteristics were 
regressed on discretionary accruals used as proxy for earnings management while 
board diligence and board independence were taken as control variables. The 
findings and recommendations are elaborated on in the following subsections. 
Research Findings 
Using the panel regression estimation results, the study found that audit 
committee independence had a negative statistical significant effect on earnings 
management consistent with Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004). The study 
aiso fo:Jtid that audit committe( meeting frequency <:!!Jd audit committee met-t! f'.g 
attendance had a negative statistical significant impact on earnings management 
in tandem with Xie et al, 2003. It could be deduced that audit committee 
independence, audit committee frequency of meetings and audit committee 
meeting attendance are useful in reducing to the barest minimum, management's 
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C o m p a n i e s  
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
A r i s i n g  f r o m  t h e  f i n d i n g s ,  a r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s :  
I t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  i n  o r d e r  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ,  
n o n - e x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r s  u s e d  a s  p r o x y  f o r  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ,  
s h o u l d  b e  i n c r e a s e d .  B e s i d e s ,  n o n - e x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r s  s h o u l d  b e  a p p o i n t e d  o n  t h e  
b a s i s  o f  c o m p e t e n c e  a n d  i n t e g r i t y .  T h e y  s h o u l d  b e  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  w i t h  s o m e  l e v e l  
o f  s k i l l s  n e e d e d  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  o v e r s e e  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  c o m p a n i e s  a l o n g s i d e  
p e r f o r m  t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  m o n i t o r i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  p r e v e n t i n g  m a n a g e r s  f r o m  
o p p o r t u n i s t i c a l l y  m a n a g i n g  e a r n i n g s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  
T h e  S e c u r i t i e s  a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  t h e  C e n t r a l  B a n k  o f  N i g e r i a  s h o u l d  
p u t  i n  p l a c e  a  r e g u l a t i o n  w h i c h  e n s u r e s  s t a t u t o r y  p o s i t i o n  o n  t h e  m a x i m u m  
n u m b e r  o f  m e e t i n g s  t o  b e  h e l d  b y  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  i n  a  y e a r .  T h e  
p r a c t i c e  w h e r e b y  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  a r e  s i m p l y  t h e r e  j u s t  t o  c o m p l e t e  t h e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s i z e  w i t h o u t  a c t i v e  a t t e n d a n c e  a n d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  a t  m e e t i n g s  
s h o u l d  b e  c u r t a i l e d .  
R e g u l a t o r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  s u c h  a s  C e n t r a l  B a n k  o f  N i g e r i a  ( C B N ) ,  S e c u r i t i e s  a n d  
E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  ( S E C )  a n d  N i g e r i a  D e p o s i t  I n s u r a n c e  C o r p o r a t i o n  ( N D I C )  
s h o u l d  o r g a n i z e  t r a i n i n g s  a n d  s e m i n a r s  o n  a  y e a r l y  b a s i s  f o r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
m e m b e r s  a s  o b t a i n a b l e  i n  o t h e r  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s  w h e r e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  t r a i n  m e m b e r s  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  T h i s  w i l l  e n a b l e  
m e m b e r s  k e e p  a b r e a s t  o f  u p  t o  d a t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a s  r e g a r d s  t h e i r  r o l e s  a n d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w h i c h  w i l l  m a k e  t h e m  m o r e  e f f e c t i v e  a n d  e f f i c i e n t  i n  t h e i r  
a s s i g n m e n t s .  
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